This interview was published in the Ahlefeldt-Holst Center Bulletin in March 2009.
During the conference "Post-US America - Cataclysm or Opportunity" in Chennai February 2009, Igor Ahlefeldt lectured on "Recurring patterns in international terrorism" and presented the following to the audience: “...Every high profile international terror attack is a false flag attack...”
The probability of high-profile terror being directed against a society is proportional
to the product of (a) the number of anti-terror personnel employed by the state of that
society, (b) the number of terror drills conducted by that personnel, and (c) the
relative international military strength of that state.
The higher the profile of any terrorist attack, the higher the probability of it being
a false-flag attack.
The highest-profile terrorist attacks are false-flag attacks.
Q: Mr. Ahlefeldt, aren't there really many more missing links before we may establish Ahlefeldt's Law? Yesterday Munich 1972 was mentioned, but take Entebbe, 1976, as another example.
A: Why don't we use the word theorem instead. Interesting that you mention Entebbe. In order to understand Entebbe, we need to understand the relationship between Golda Meir and Idi Amin. It was not unlike the relationship between Cheney and Dubya. There was one party who was in control, who pulled the stops, called the shots, reaped the gains, and another party who played the media clown while coming across as barely in posession of his faculties. We can call this type of relationship a false flag political relationship. Idi Amin came to power through an Israeli aided coup and he was pivotal in Israel's efforts in Uganda at the time. While it is unclear to us today what Israel hoped to gain from its Ugandan endeavor or if it indeed suceeded at all, it is evident that the Israeli assisted coup and the subsequent turnaround of Idi Amin in 1972, from being an ally to becoming fervently anti-Israeli, are both related to the Entebbe hijacking. We do not know all the details, but we know enough to say that Entebbe does indeed satisfy my theorem. I tend to believe that Entebbe became necessary because Israel was not able to control Idi Amin. You can imagine what would have happened if Dubya had resisted the Neocon takeover in a similar way. We might have had many more 9/11s.
This brings us to what international terrorism fundamentally is. It is never directed at its victims. The victims are irrelevant to the terrorists. They are actually not the target, just instruments. The aim is to establish control, either over a country's policy, very often its foreign or security policy or its alliances, to change that policy or those alliances or to prevent a change of that policy or those alliances.
As for 9/11, the aim of the terrorists was first of all to gain popular acceptance for the occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan, but also to quell resistance against widespread implementation of surveillance and biometrics. As for the London and Madrid bombings, the aim of the terrorists was to bolster support for European participation in the occupation of Iraq. As for the Mumbay massacre, the aim was to make US missile attacks inside Pakistan palatable to a wider audience.
The reason why there is terrorism, is because more often than not we let the terrorists attain their goals. About half of all Americans accept the reasoning behind the foreign wars. Few people in the West refuse to be issued biometric passports or ID cards. The protests against the US encroachments upon Pakistani sovereignty are mostly limited to Pakistan. In this way, the terrorists see that terrorism is much less costly and takes much less time or effort than to proceed through the parliamentary political channels of the Western democracies. Until this changes, we will keep having international terrorism.
Q: To return to your theorem. Achille Lauro..?
A: Mossad. Read Ben-Menashe.
Q: Daniel Pearl?
A: Mossad. No, the theorem holds.
Q: And Munich..?
A: I know. It is the only one that doesn't fit. I suspect it actually fits the theorem, we just do not have the information.